USA v. Donte Jacobs by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-16-2021 
USA v. Donte Jacobs 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Donte Jacobs" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 1021. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/1021 
This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 







On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(District Court No. 1:19-cr-00094-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
     
Argued on March 11, 2021  
 
Before: SMITH*, Chief Judge, McKEE, AMBRO, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 16, 2021) 
 
     
* Judge Smith was Chief Judge at the time this appeal was 
argued.  Judge Smith completed his term as Chief Judge and 
assumed senior status on December 4, 2021. 
 2 
Whitney C. Cloud  [Argued] 
Jesse S. Wenger 
Christopher de Barrena-Sarobe 
Office of United States Attorney 
1313 North Market Street 
Hercules Building, Suite 400 
Wilmington, DE 19801 
  Attorneys for Appellee 
Peter Goldberger  [Argued] 
50 Rittenhouse Place 
Ardmore, PA 19003 
 






AMBRO, Circuit Judge. 
Jurors have a marked edge when weighing trial 
evidence.  They view it firsthand and can assess the credibility 
of the witness testimony based on their own observations.  
Appeals courts, on the other hand, are limited to reviewing a 
cold record, sometimes years after the trial took place.  So 
when challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence come to us 
on appeal, we are careful not to usurp the jury’s role by acting 
as independent factfinders.  Instead, we review its verdict for 
“bare rationality,” asking only whether any reasonable juror 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.   
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Donte Jacobs asks us to hold the jury’s guilty verdicts 
against him—for distributing and conspiring to distribute the 
fentanyl and heroin that caused Therisa Ally’s overdose 
death—fell below that threshold level of rationality.  Now on 
appeal, he tries to establish reasonable doubt by pointing to 
gaps in the Government’s evidence and offering alternative 
explanations for Ally’s death.   
We are unconvinced.  Though the Government did not 
prove Jacobs’ crimes with 100% certainty, it was not required 
to do so.  A rational juror could have decided Jacobs was guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt after drawing inferences from the 
evidence and testimony presented at trial.  We will not second-
guess that decision.    
The District Court also did not err in its jury instructions 
or in denying the defense’s challenges under Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  It did, though, incorrectly 
impose a “general sentence” for Jacobs’ three convictions 
rather than impose an individual sentence for each offense.  We 
thus vacate his sentence and remand to the District Court to 
clarify a specific sentence for each offense. 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
The last thing Jeffrey Kane remembers before falling 
asleep in the early hours of June 29, 2016, was his girlfriend, 
Therisa Ally, sitting cross-legged on the floor by their bed.  He 
heard wax bags being shaken and saw her arms moving like 
they did when she was preparing her heroin.  They had fought 
earlier that night about her heroin addiction and weren’t 
speaking to each other.  He got up from the bed, took an 
Ambien, and fell asleep.   
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When he awoke the next morning, Ally was still sitting 
cross-legged on the floor next to their bed.  She was slumped 
over.  He felt her, and then shook her a bit, but she was stiff 
and cold to the touch.  He quickly called 911 and tried to lay 
her down to perform CPR, but he couldn’t maneuver her body 
into the correct position.  When the emergency workers 
arrived, they found Ally lying on her side at the foot of her bed 
with a tourniquet wrapped around her right arm.  There was no 
pulse.   
After they determined Ally could not be resuscitated, 
police officers cleared the room and began collecting evidence.  
Sticking out from the bed, just above Ally’s knees, the officers 
spotted a purple clutch purse.  In it they found four bundles of 
what appeared to be heroin, divided into smaller wax bags 
bearing an ink stamp butterfly image and the word “Butter.”  
One of the wax packages was later tested at a lab and found to 
contain a mixture of heroin and fentanyl.   
On the floor of the bedroom, the officers found another 
purse.  This red-patterned shoulder bag, described by one 
officer as “basically a to-go bag for drug users,” contained a 
“bunch of syringes” and nine empty wax packets that were 
stamped with a skull wearing a Viking helmet.  Appx. at 476.  
No other “Viking bags” were found in the room.1  
The police also discovered a small round coin purse in 
the bedroom, holding nine full bags of drugs packaged in wax 
packets bearing a stamp of a bulldog wearing a top hat.  The 
lab tested just one of these bags and determined it contained 
 
1 One of the investigating officers testified at trial that the 
police did not request lab testing for the residue in the Viking 
bags because there was “nothing in them.”  Appx. at 497.    
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only heroin.  There were no empty “Bulldog bags” in the 
bedroom.  
Other drug paraphernalia lay strewn about the room.  
Two empty Butter bags were torn open on the floor; another 54 
empty Butter bags were in the trash can.  Near Ally’s feet was 
a used syringe, blue bottle top, and a packet of cigarettes, with 
one cigarette pulled out and the filter partially removed.2  A 
syringe loaded with a brown substance sat on a shelf in the 
bedroom.  
The day after Ally’s death, Kane agreed to cooperate 
with agents and to conduct a controlled purchase of drugs from 
Jonathan Collins.  Collins had been Ally’s dealer for about two 
and a half years, and she had bought five bundles of heroin 
from him nearly every day.3  In fact, Ally had bought heroin 
from him—the Butter brand—the evening of her death.  At the 
meeting, Collins handed Kane five bundles of Butter-stamped 
heroin.  Kane asked Collins if it was “that same stuff” from the 
night Ally overdosed, and Collins (not knowing Ally had 
passed away) confirmed it was.  Appx. at 549, 694.  With that, 
the officers stepped in, seized the heroin bundle, and arrested 
Collins.  A Drug Enforcement Agency laboratory tested 
samples from those Butter bags and determined that, like the 
Butter bag tested from Ally’s room, they contained fentanyl 
and heroin.  Yet unlike the samples taken from the bedroom, 
 
2 Detective Cowdright explained that an addict prepares an 
injection of heroin by mixing water and heroin powder in a 
bottle top, soaking up the liquid with a cigarette filter, and 
loading a syringe through the filter so that any chunks are 
removed.   
3 Collins estimated that Ally had not bought heroin from him 
10 to 20 days in the two and a half years he had been her dealer.  
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the lab performed a quantitative analysis on these drugs and 
concluded that fentanyl was “the most substantial portion of 
the substance within that mixture.”4  Id. at 587. 
Collins agreed to cooperate with the police and 
explained that he had obtained the Butter-stamped heroin from 
Donte Jacobs.  The latter had approached Collins about dealing 
his heroin at the end of February or beginning of March 2016.  
By mid-March, Jacobs became Collins’ only heroin supplier 
after Collins received positive “customer feedback” on Jacobs’ 
heroin.  Under their arrangement, Jacobs gave pre-packaged 
bags to Collins, who then sold them to users like Ally.  
According to Collins, Jacobs knew that he was selling heroin 
in Delaware, and Collins even gave him “customer feedback” 
from time to time.   
Jacobs was eventually arrested for distributing the drugs 
that killed Ally, and he opted to go to trial.  During jury 
selection, the Government used its peremptory strikes to strike 
all but one minority juror.  Jacobs, an African-American, raised 
a Batson challenge, asserting that the Government was striking 
jurors for racially discriminatory reasons.  When questioned by 
the District Court, the prosecutor explained that he struck Juror 
9, also African-American, because he “was asleep during most 
of the Court’s initial questioning” and had pink and bleached 
hair, which “goes with sort of a counter culture.” Id. at 369.  
And Juror 26, who is Latino, was struck also, as “he had issues 
with the criminal justice system because of statistics and 
 
4 Drug dealers mix heroin with substances such as fentanyl to 
“make more product.”  Appx. at 776.  When they do, it is “not 
an exact science.”  Id. at 778.  So “[s]ome bags may not contain 
any fentanyl, [and] some may contain a . . . higher 
concentration of fentanyl.”  Id. 
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studies that he read.”  Id. at 372.  The prosecutor worried that 
Juror 26 “may implicitly hold the government to a higher 
burden, particularly with defendants that are minority 
defendants.”  Id.  He also mentioned that Juror 26 seemed 
“involved in statistics” and might try to apply the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard to a mathematical certainty.  Id. at 
373.5  After explaining that he believed the prosecutor’s 
reasons, the District Court Judge rejected the Batson challenge 
and proceeded to trial.   
At trial, Kane, Collins, and the various police officers 
involved in the investigation testified.  A forensic pathologist, 
Dr. Daniel Brown, also testified and explained that, based on 
his autopsy of Ally, she died of a drug overdose—specifically, 
“acute multiple drug intoxication.”  Id. at 788, 800.  A forensic 
toxicologist, he said, would have to “determine which drugs 
caused the most damage.”  Id. at 800.  The forensic 
toxicologist, Dr. Michael Coyer, then testified that most drugs 
in Ally’s system were at or on “the low side” of therapeutic 
levels.  Id. at 823.  But the fentanyl dosage in her blood stream 
was “ten times higher than what would be the reported 
therapeutic range.”  Id. at 824.  It was, in fact, a “lethal level of 
fentanyl.”  Id.  “[B]ut for the use of that substance that 
contained fentanyl,” Coyer explained, Ally “would not have 
died.”  Id. at 826.  
Coyer also noted that the postmortem performed on 
Ally established that her blood was “consistent with someone 
who died from a substance contained in the Butter bag” the lab 
had tested.  Id. at 825.  He recognized, though, that this 
conclusion rested on the lab’s determination that the Butter 
 
5 The Government also used its peremptory strikes on other 
minority jurors, but Jacobs does not challenge those on appeal.  
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bag—like Ally’s blood sample—contained heroin and 
fentanyl.  He did not know the concentrations of heroin or 
fentanyl in the tested bag because the lab only performed a 
qualitative analysis.  His analysis also did not address the 
possibility that the Viking or Bulldog bags caused Ally’s death, 
as no Viking bags were tested and the sample Bulldog bag only 
contained heroin.   
The jury ultimately convicted Jacobs of two counts: 
(1) conspiracy to distribute and/or possess with the intent to 
distribute fentanyl and heroin resulting in death (Count 1); and 
(2) distribution of fentanyl and heroin resulting in death (Count 
2).6  The District Court sentenced Jacobs to 288 months’ 
imprisonment and five years of supervised release, but it did 
not specify a sentence on each count.  This appeal followed.7 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Jacobs’ conspiracy and distribution offenses contain a 
two-part penalty structure.  If he were found guilty just of 
distributing or conspiring to distribute heroin and fentanyl, he 
could be sentenced to no more than 20 years in prison.  21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846.  But Congress enhanced 
the penalty for distribution where “death or serious bodily 
injury results from the use of such substance”: a 20-year 
mandatory minimum, with a maximum life sentence.  Id. 
§ 841(b)(1)(C).  Because the jury found Jacobs guilty on all 
charges and that Ally’s death “resulted from the use of 
 
6 Jacobs did plead guilty to one count of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.  18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).   
7 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  Appellate jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). 
 9 
fentanyl” he distributed and conspired to distribute, he faced a 
mandatory minimum of 20 years in prison. 
Jacobs now raises four arguments on appeal.  First, the 
evidence could not support the death-resulting convictions 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Second, the jury instruction 
explaining § 841(b)’s “results in” language should have 
charged the jury to find proximate, not just actual, cause.  
Third, the Government’s peremptory strikes of Jurors 9 and 26 
violated Batson’s bar on the discriminatory exclusion of 
minority jurors.  And finally, the Court’s imposition of a 
“general sentence” on the three counts, rather than an 
individual sentence on each count, requires resentencing.  We 
address each argument in turn. 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
We begin with Jacobs’ assertion that the Government 
presented insufficient evidence to show his distribution 
activities resulted in Ally’s death.  Jacobs contends there were 
alternative explanations for Ally’s overdose and the 
Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
fentanyl that killed Ally came from the Butter bags he sold.  
After all, he says, no one saw which bag Ally used when she 
overdosed.  And the Government only tested samples from one 
Butter bag and one Bulldog bag, and never even sent the 
Viking bags to the lab.  No evidence ever tied Jacobs to the 
Bulldog and Viking bags; so, if Ally overdosed using one of 
those, her death could not be traced back to him.   
We are unconvinced.  Jurors, not judges, are the 
factfinders in criminal cases, and part of a juror’s role is to 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at 
trial.  See Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012).  Our 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence is thus highly 
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deferential to the jury’s verdict.  We look at the record in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution and ask only whether 
any “reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient 
to support the conclusion of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 
F.3d 418, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting United 
States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)).  And we 
uphold the verdict as long as it does not “fall below the 
threshold of bare rationality.”  Id. at 431 (quoting Coleman, 
566 U.S. at 656).   
What’s more, because Jacobs failed to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence before the District Court, we 
review only for plain error.  He must now show that (1) there 
was an error, (2) it was plain (i.e., clear under current law), and 
(3) it affected his substantial rights.  United States v. Fattah, 
914 F.3d 112, 172 (3d Cir. 2019).  Even then, we will only 
address the error if we conclude that (4) it “seriously affected 
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceeding.”  Id.   
It is not settled how much more deferential plain-error 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence can be, but, even 
under our normal review, this jury’s verdict would pass 
scrutiny.  The Government’s evidence sufficiently established 
the following.  Jacobs supplied the Butter bags that Ally bought 
the night of her death and were later found near her body.  
Appx. at 549–50 (Kane’s testimony that the heroin Collins 
gave him in a controlled purchase was the “same thing that 
[Ally] had gotten”); id. at 615 (Collins’ testimony that Jacobs 
was his only supplier before Ally’s death); id. at 627 (Collins’ 
testimony that he had given Ally Butter-stamped heroin on 
June 28, 2016, and had given Kane the same Butter-stamped 
heroin on June 30, 2016).  Second, testing revealed that one of 
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the Butter bags near Ally’s body, and several of the Butter bags 
later bought in a controlled purchase from Collins, contained 
fentanyl.  Third, Ally would not have died had she not injected 
fentanyl.   
Finally, there was enough evidence for a jury to 
conclude that the Butter bags, and not the Viking and Bulldog 
bags, were the source of the lethal drugs Ally ingested before 
her death.  The Bulldog bags were full, no empty Bulldog bags 
were found in the bedroom, and one of the full bags selected 
for testing contained only heroin and no fentanyl.  Appx. at 
482, 485–86.  The empty Viking bags were in a closed shoulder 
bag—to repeat, often a “to-go bag for drug users”—which 
supports the inference that Ally ingested the substance of those 
bags well before her death.  Id. at 476.  Further, dozens of 
empty Butter bags were found in the trash can and on the floor 
near Ally’s body, but the Bulldog and Viking bags were found 
only inside a coin purse and shoulder bag, respectively.  To 
credit Jacobs’ suggestion that the lethal fentanyl came from the 
Viking or Bulldog bags, the jury would have to believe Ally 
placed them inside a bag or purse before overdosing despite 
evidence that she died suddenly with a tourniquet still on her 
arm.  The jury rejected Jacobs’ explanation, which was 
discussed during defense counsel’s cross-examination and 
closing arguments.   
Together, this evidence is enough for a rational juror to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Butter bags 
supplied by Jacobs were the source of the lethal fentanyl Ally 
ingested.  Quantitative testing of a greater number of the bags 
found at the scene no doubt was preferable, but we will not 
disturb the jury’s decision when the other evidence is more 
than enough to meet the low bar for affirming Jacobs’ 
convictions.  Indeed, “[r]eversing the jury’s conclusion simply 
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because another inference is possible—or even equally 
plausible—is inconsistent with the proper inquiry for review of 
sufficiency of the evidence challenges.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d at 432. 
B. The Jury Instruction 
Jacobs also insists that even if there were sufficient 
evidence to support his convictions, the District Court erred by 
failing to instruct the jury that “proximate cause,” on top of 
“but-for cause,” is required to prove that “death resulted” from 
drug distribution under § 841(b).  In other words, the District 
Court told the jury guilt exists no matter how far down the 
chain of causation Jacobs became involved (in legalese, actual 
cause or but-for causation), but it should have instructed that 
they could find him guilty only if Ally’s death was a 
“foreseeable result” of his heroin distribution (that is, 
proximate cause).8  Though we normally exercise plenary 
 
8 But-for causation means that a result can be traced back to a 
triggering action—no matter how far down the chain of 
causation you have to go.  So if Jacobs sold fentanyl to Collins 
and Collins sold fentanyl to Ally and Ally overdosed on 
fentanyl, all that matters is that if Jacobs hadn’t sold Collins 
the fentanyl, Ally wouldn’t have overdosed.   
In contrast, proximate causation cuts the causal chain at 
foreseeability.  Let’s say Jacobs sold a non-lethal amount of 
fentanyl to Collins, who sold to a user who combined it with 
other fentanyl (making the dosage fatal) and then overdosed.  If 
we applied proximate causation, then even though the user 
would not have died without Jacobs selling the non-lethal dose 
of fentanyl, Jacobs would not be responsible unless he could 
have foreseen how the user would combine fentanyl doses. 
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review to determine whether a jury instruction misstated the 
law, see United States v. Piekarsky, 687 F.3d 134, 142 (3d Cir. 
2012), Jacobs admits that this argument is subject only to plain-
error review because he failed to raise it at trial.  Our precedent 
forecloses Jacobs’ proximate cause argument, so he has not 
shown error, much less plain error. 
Jacobs would face a 20-year mandatory minimum if 
Ally’s death “result[ed] from the use” of the fentanyl that he 
distributed.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).  Though the statute 
does not define whether “results from” means proximate or 
actual causation, our Court answered this question in United 
States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824 (3d Cir. 1999).  The plain 
language of § 841(b)(1)(C) “neither requires nor indicates that 
a district court must find that death resulting from the use of a 
drug distributed by a defendant was a reasonably foreseeable 
event.”  Id. at 830 (citing United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 
139, 145 (4th Cir. 1994)).  Instead, the provision puts drug 
dealers on “clear notice that their sentences will be enhanced if 
people die from using the drugs they distribute.”  Id. (quoting 
Patterson, 38 F.3d at 145).  Because Congress recognized that 
“risk is inherent in the [drug] product,” it intended to enhance 
a defendant’s sentence whenever death resulted from the 
distribution of certain drugs, regardless of whether that 
defendant could have reasonably foreseen that death would 
result.  Id. at 831. 
Jacobs maintains that the Supreme Court effectively 
overruled Robinson in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 
(2014), and Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014).  
But we do not read those cases so broadly.  In Burrage—
another case involving the “death results” element of § 841—
the trial court refused to give either a but-for cause instruction 
or a proximate cause instruction.  When reviewing that 
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decision, the Supreme Court observed that “a defendant 
generally may not be convicted unless his conduct is both 
(1) the actual cause, and (2) the ‘legal’ cause (often called the 
‘proximate cause’) of the result.”  Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Court, though, never reached whether § 841 contains a 
proximate cause requirement because it reversed the 
defendant’s conviction based on the trial court’s failure to give 
a but-for cause instruction.  Id. at 210, 219. 
Jacobs’ appeal to Paroline fares no better.  There the 
Supreme Court considered a child pornography statute that, 
unlike § 841, included an express proximate cause 
requirement.  Paroline, 572 U.S. at 446.  Although Paroline 
generally observed that the “concept of proximate causation is 
applicable in both criminal and tort law,” id. at 444, it did not 
import a proximate cause requirement into § 841 or discuss 
that statute at all.   
Neither Burrage’s nor Paroline’s general 
pronouncements about proximate cause in criminal statutes are 
enough to overrule our precedent.  So we continue to follow 
Robinson until reconsidered by our Court en banc or 
undermined by the Supreme Court.  See Karns v. Shanahan, 
879 F.3d 504, 514 (3d Cir. 2018); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1.  
Further, even if Burrage, Paroline, or any of the other 
cases cited by Jacobs did chip away at our reasoning in 
Robinson, it was not “plain error” for the District Court to rely 
on it.  An error is plain only if it was “clear under current law.”  
Fattah, 914 F.3d at 172.  As we have never explicitly overruled 
our current law—Robinson—it can hardly be clear the District 
Court should not have followed it.  It thus did not plainly err in 
offering only a but-for causation jury instruction.  
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C. The Batson Challenge 
Next, Jacobs argues that the District Court erred before 
his trial even began when it allowed the Government to use its 
peremptory strikes to remove all but one minority venire 
member from the jury.  Though the Government may generally 
use its peremptory challenges however it likes, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause prohibits striking jurors 
based on their race.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.  Jacobs insists on 
appeal that the Government did so when it struck two minority 
jurors from his panel: Juror 9 and Juror 26, his focus being 
more on the latter. 
A trial court determines whether a peremptory strike 
violates equal protection using the burden-shifting framework 
established in Batson.  First, the defendant must make out a 
prima facie case of discriminatory intent.  Id. at 93–94.  If that 
occurs, the Government, as a second step, must provide a race-
neutral explanation for exercising its peremptory strike.  Id. at 
94.  At that step, the explanation need not be “persuasive, or 
even plausible.”  United States v. Savage, 970 F.3d 217, 266 
(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 
(1995) (per curiam)).  Instead, at the third step, the court 
evaluates the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s proffered 
reasons to decide whether the Government was “motivated in 
substantial part by discriminatory intent.”  Flowers v. 
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2244 (2019) (quoting Foster v. 
Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016)).   
Our appellate review of a Batson challenge is highly 
deferential to the trial court.  Though we will take a fresh look 
to ensure that the district court did not deviate from the Batson 
analytical framework, United States v. Milan, 304 F.3d 273, 
283 (3d Cir. 2002), deciding whether there was discriminatory 
intent “represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great 
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deference on appeal,” Savage, 970 F.3d at 267 (quoting 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991)).  This is 
because finding discriminatory intent “largely will turn on [an] 
evaluation of credibility.”  Flowers, 139 S. Ct. at 2244 (quoting 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21).   
Though the parties agree that the defense made out a 
prima facie case of discrimination, satisfying Batson’s first 
step, Jacobs insists that there were errors at both steps two and 
three of the Batson analysis.  First, he argues that the 
Government’s reasons for striking Juror 26 were not race-
neutral.  The prosecutor, in part, struck that juror due to his 
“issues with the criminal justice system because of statistics 
and studies that he read.”  Appx. at 372.  Jacobs claims that 
because Juror 26 based his views in part on his own 
experiences as a Latino person, this was not a race-neutral 
reason for the strike.   
We disagree.  The Ninth Circuit has explained that 
“[c]hallenging a prospective juror on the basis of his expressed 
opinions about the judicial system does not violate Batson.”  
Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1999); see id. 
(“Batson does not forbid striking a juror who holds a particular 
opinion about the U.S. justice system.  Rather, it forbids 
striking jurors based on their race.” (quoting United States v. 
Fike, 82 F.3d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir. 1996))).  As in that case, 
Jacobs did not try to make any showing before the District 
Court that “concern regarding the potential of racist attitudes 
of juries is ‘a characteristic that is peculiar to any race,’” id. 
(quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769), so striking him on that basis 
was not the equivalent of striking him because of his race.  
Moreover, the Government offered another race-neutral reason 
for removing Juror 26 that satisfied step two: he was a 
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“numbers guy” who might inadvertently hold the Government 
to too high a burden.   
Second, Jacobs claims that the District Court failed to 
conduct a proper analysis at “step three” of Batson.  He 
contends that it mistakenly believed it was bound to accept the 
Government’s reasons for its strikes if they were facially 
neutral.  But that diverges from the record.  After the 
Government provided its reasons, the Court allowed the 
defense to respond.  It then properly conducted a step-three 
analysis and reached its own conclusion—based on the 
evidence and its own evaluation of the prosecutor’s 
credibility—that the Government lacked discriminatory intent.  
The Court “accept[ed] that Number 9 ha[d] been, at a 
minimum, do[z]ing on and off”—which we take to mean that 
it determined the prosecutor’s account was credible, not that it 
was deferring to whatever the prosecutor said.  Appx. at 379.  
This is reinforced by its affirmation that the Government’s 
reason for striking Juror 26 “make[s] sense” because the Court 
“believe[d] [the prosecutor] when he sa[id] why he did these 
various things.”  Id. at 378–79.  The District Judge reiterated 
this in his memorandum denying Jacobs’ post-trial motions, 
saying, “I credited the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations” 
and “evaluated the justifications.”  Id. at 13.   
The District Court thus properly engaged in a thorough 
dialogue with counsel and scrutinized the evidence before 
determining that the Government’s race-neutral reasons were 
not pretextual.  The Judge adequately explained why he 
believed the Government’s reasons were valid and, after giving 
the defense ample time to respond, told why he was not 
persuaded by the defense’s arguments.  Jacobs has identified 
nothing clearly erroneous about those conclusions.  Thus they 
stand. 
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D. The General Sentence 
Finally, Jacobs requests a full resentencing because the 
District Court imposed a “general sentence” without 
explaining which parts of the sentence were attributable to the 
three counts of conviction.  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
the District Court must impose a sentence for each count.  See 
United States v. Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b), (c)).  The Government concedes that did 
not occur here but argues we should merely remand for 
clarification rather than full resentencing.  We agree. 
 In Ward, when we determined that the Guidelines did 
not allow for general sentences, we simply said that we would 
“remand for resentencing.”  Id. at 184–86.  We didn’t explain 
whether that involved a full resentencing process or just 
clarification of the sentence.  But we cited, id. at 185, a case 
from the Eleventh Circuit that “remand[ed] . . . for clarification 
of the sentence,” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 
1025 (11th Cir. 2005), and one from the D.C. Circuit 
instructing the district court to “specify sentences for the 
individual counts” while it fixed other errors in sentencing, 
United States v. Hall, 610 F.3d 727, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  A 
few years after Ward, in United States v. Andrews, we were 
more direct about what we meant by “resentencing” when we 
vacated the defendant’s general sentence:  “[W]e will vacate 
. . . and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the District 
Court to clarify the sentence imposed on each count of 
conviction.”  681 F.3d 509, 532 (3d Cir. 2012).  We thus follow 
suit by vacating and remanding Jacobs’ sentence for 
clarification. 
* * * 
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 A jury found Therisa Ally died because Jacobs cut the 
heroin he distributed to her dealer with a lethal dose of 
fentanyl.  It reached that conclusion based on reasonable 
inferences from the evidence presented at trial.  Finding no 
error in the District Court or jury’s decisions, we affirm Jacobs’ 
convictions.  But because the Court improperly imposed a 
general sentence, we vacate and remand to clarify the sentence 
specified for each count.   
McKee, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment dubitante.1 
I join the Majority’s discussion of the jury-instruction 
issue, the Batson issue, and the sentencing error without 
reservation.  I also concur in the judgment affirming the 
conviction for distributing heroin causing Therisa Ally’s death.  
I do so, however, with strong reservations, which compel me 
to explain that my concurrence in the judgment is dubitante.  I 
am dubitante about the result because the government’s 
attempt to prove that Jacobs provided the heroin that killed 
Ally can best be described as cavalier and presumptuous.  
Nevertheless, the government need not negate all possible 
alternatives to Jacobs being the fatal dealer.  Its burden is only 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all doubt.2  
Accordingly, given the very deferential standard governing our 
review of a jury verdict, I cannot disagree with the conclusion 
that the inferences here combined to clear the evidentiary 
threshold necessary to establish that Jacobs sold Ally the fatal 
dose of heroin.   As Judge Ambro explains, the resulting 
conviction satisfies the “bare rationality” threshold—though 
just barely.3  
I do, however, hope that if the government attempts to 
convict someone for distributing a controlled substance 
resulting in death in the future, it will present a more 
convincing and less inferential case than it did here.  In 
prosecuting such a charge, the government must always 
thoroughly prepare and present the evidence.  I write in the 
hope of advancing that end.  Nevertheless, the standard of 
review compels me to reluctantly agree that the conviction for 
distribution causing death withstands this challenge, though 
only by the narrowest of margins.  
I. 
 
1 The term “dubitante” is affixed to the name of the judge, 
“indicating that the judge doubted a legal point but was 
unwilling to state that it was wrong.”  Dubitante, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  See, e.g., Salvation Army 
v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs., 919 F.2d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(Becker, J., concurring dubitante).  
2 United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1998).   
3 Op. at 3. 
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A criminal conviction may surely rest upon reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence, as long as the totality of 
the evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Affirming this conviction for distribution resulting in 
death requires us to piece together several layers of inference.  
The result, though surviving our deferential review, comes 
perilously close to rank speculation.  This could have been 
avoided if the government treated that charge with the 
seriousness that the enhanced penalty (indeed any criminal 
conviction) merits.   
A. 
 The government’s argument basically asks us to accept 
a syllogism that appears straight-forward:  Collins sold Ally 
Butter heroin that he obtained from Jacobs, that heroin was 
laced with fentanyl, Ally’s fentanyl measures were high 
enough to cause death, and she died with Butter heroin bags 
near her.  Thus, argues the government, Collins is responsible 
for selling Ally the heroin/fentanyl mixture that killed her, and 
that is sufficient to establish Jacobs’s guilt of distributing and 
conspiring to distribute the fatal dose beyond a reasonable 
doubt because Collins obtained it from Jacobs.  Part of the 
foundation of this syllogism rests upon the evidence that the 
purse with Butter bags was found “immediately to the left of 
Ally’s body”4 and two empty Butter bags were “directly in 
front of where Ally was sitting.”5  According to the 
government’s argument, these dots are sufficient for the jury to 
draw a line connecting Jacobs to Ally’s fatal injection of 
fentanyl beyond a reasonable doubt when considered along 
with Kane’s testimony about purchasing drugs from Jacobs. 
 Although, as I just noted, that line is sufficiently rigid to 
withstand our deferential review, this prosecution raises 
concerns that bear mentioning.  I begin with the fact that there 
was no medical testimony that would have established that 
Ally either became immobile or died almost immediately upon 
injecting the fatal dose of heroin.  Such testimony would have 
made any reliance on the proximity of the empty Butter bags 
more probative.  The jury should not have had to infer that 
dying with a tourniquet meant that Ally became immobile or 
 
4 Appellee’s Br. 3 (citing App. 486–87). 
5 Id. (citing App. 492–93). 
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died just after injecting the fatal dose of heroin.6  There is also 
testimony that her body had been repeatedly moved.  Thus, 
attempts to erect a logical inference based upon the proximity 
of Butter heroin to her lifeless body once police arrived is not 
nearly as probative as the government argues.  There is also no 
way of knowing the extent to which those in the room disturbed 
the location of the various packets and bundles of heroin that 
were ultimately found near her body.  Kane testified about 
where Ally was sitting when he went to sleep, but he did not 
testify about the location of any packets of heroin on the floor 
or in the room before the police arrived the next morning.  
There is more. 
B. 
The government’s evidence that Jacobs sold Ally the 
fatal dose of heroin was inconclusive.  When the DEA expert 
was asked whether drug dealers mix heroin with fentanyl “in 
precise quantities,” he answered: 
No.  I mean, it’s not an exact science.  Right.  So 
if you have -- your cutting agent is fentanyl and 
your powder here is heroin, and all you’re doing 
is mixing it.  Some bags may not contain any 
fentanyl, some may contain a great -- higher 
concentration of fentanyl.  So there’s no exact 
science when these guys are putting these 
packages together.7  
Despite the variation in the quantity of the two drugs present 
in heroin mixtures sold on the street, the lab tested only one of 
the more than fifty small bags of Butter heroin from the 
sandwich bag that was collected for testing.  More than fifty 
other bags containing residue, on the floor and in the garbage 
can in the bedroom, were not even collected.  The government 
also failed to test the “brown substance” that was in a syringe 
found in Ally’s bedroom.8  Moreover, as I shall elaborate 
below, the government offered nothing to allow the jury to 
conclude that the samples tested were representative of the 
samples found in the room.  There was absolutely no 
explanation offered to the jury to explain why the sampling that 
 
6 See Op. at 4. 
7 App. 778. 
8 App. 513–14.  
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was done provided a sufficient basis to extrapolate the contents 
of the unsampled bags of Butter heroin, let alone establish their 
contents beyond a reasonable doubt.   
In United States v. McCutchen, we explained that when 
a defendant challenges a “determination that is based on 
extrapolation from a test sample, the district court must make 
a finding that there is an adequate factual basis for the 
extrapolation and that the quantity was determined in a manner 
consistent with accepted standards of reliability.”9  There, we 
were deciding whether weighing a small sample of drugs 
seized from a defendant was sufficient to allow the court to 
determine the total weight of the drugs for sentencing 
purposes.10  That, of course, is a much lesser burden than the 
proof required to convict a defendant of a crime.  At 
sentencing, the government had relied on the weight of 15 of 
119 vials of crack cocaine to extrapolate the total weight of the 
cocaine McCutchen possessed.  However, the evidence 
showed that all 15 of the tested vials contained crack cocaine, 
and a chemist testified about how the vials were selected for 
testing as well as the fact that the vials tested appeared the same 
as the vials not tested.  Here, there is no basis for the jury to 
reliably determine anything about the finding they were asked 
to make based upon an extrapolation, and the court did not 
attempt to give the jury any such guidance. 
Given that testimony, we held that “a fairly strong 
inference arises that the remaining vials, which were seized in 
the same location during the same act of distribution, also 
contained crack cocaine.”11  In concluding that this was 
sufficient to establish the weight of the drugs McCutchen 
possessed by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of 
applying the Sentencing Guidelines, we relied in part on the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Pirre.12  
There, Pirre argued that the estimated weight of 15.09 
kilograms was so close to the 15-kilogram sentencing 
threshold that all fifteen cocaine bricks that were seized from 
 
9 992 F.2d 22, 23 (3d Cir. 1993). 
10 Id.  
11 Id. at 26. 
12 927 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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him should have been weighed.  However, “all 15 packages 
appeared to be the same size, contained the same logo, were 
wrapped in the same type of electrical tape, and each appeared 
to be a standard one-kilogram brick.”13  Additionally, the 
chemist had tested eight of the fifteen bricks (more than half), 
and each contained cocaine.  As a result, the district court 
found that the government had established, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the total weight of the cocaine Pirre 
possessed was 15.09 kilograms, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed.14 
In contrast, here, only one sandwich bag of Butter 
heroin was collected from the house.  That sandwich bag 
contained fifty-two smaller bags, but only one of those was 
tested.  Thus, only about 2% of what was collected was tested, 
and what was collected was only a fraction of what was found 
at the scene.  There was no evidence about how the tested bag 
compared with those that were not tested, nor was there 
evidence that such a small sample size could support a reliable 
extrapolation.  Nor was there any jury instruction about how 
the jury should consider the size of the sample15 or whether it 
formed a sufficiently strong basis to conclude anything about 
the items that were not tested.16  Moreover, as I have already 
noted, the government’s own expert testified that there is 
absolutely no consistency in the proportion of fentanyl mixed 
in street drugs.  
  In addition, even ignoring the pitifully small sampling, 
there is no evidence about any similarity of size or weight of 
the Butter or Bulldog bags to allow one to conclude that the 
contents of the seized heroin were the same as the heroin that 
was not seized or tested.  In fact, as I have just explained, the 
jury was informed that there is no generally accepted 
proportion of heroin to mixing agent.  Thus, the evidence 
would only allow the jury to conclude that some of the packets 
that were not tested contained more fentanyl than the tested 
packets, some contained less, and some may not have 
 
13 McCutchen, 992 F.2d at 25. 
14 Id. 
15 However, defense counsel did not object to the lack of an 
instruction that would have guided the jury’s finding about 
the accuracy of any sampling. 
16 See App. 851–80.  
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contained any.  No government witnesses, including Dr. 
Coyer, the forensic toxicologist, provided any logic behind the 
choice to sample the particular bags tested out of the ones 
collected.   
Yet there are still more problems with the government’s 
attempt to prove Jacobs sold Ally the heroin that killed her.  
The tested Butter bag was taken from a nearby purse instead of 
from residue in an emptied bag on the floor or in the trashcan, 
and there is no evidence that the tested sample was from the 
same batch that Ally used the night of her death.  Detective 
Cowdright explained the full bags were collected for testing 
instead of the empty ones because the empty bags had “nothing 
in them but residue” and thus “[t]here was no reason to send 
them.”17  However, the tested Bulldog bag had only a “residue 
amount[.]”18  Nor was there any explanation of why the residue 
in the empty bags could not be tested.  It is also logical to 
assume that the heroin that Ally used that night came from a 
bag that had only residue as the other bags appeared 
undisturbed. 
When Kane conducted a controlled buy of Butter heroin 
from Collins the day after Ally’s death, the heroin he bought 
contained fentanyl.  The government argues that this suggests 
the fatal dose of fentanyl-laced heroin that killed Ally also 
came from Jacobs via Collins.  But this is just more speculation 
that encounters the same problems of unexplained sampling 
and imprecise mixing. 
C. 
These omissions are exacerbated because the laboratory 
tests only provided a qualitative analysis of the actual samples, 
not a quantitative one.  Therefore, the government could not 
even establish the actual quantity of fentanyl in the bags that 
were sampled.  It certainly could not establish the quantity of 
fentanyl in the Viking bags, which were not tested at all, or the 
eight untested Bulldog bags.   
The government attempts to fill these holes by relying 
upon the fact that Jacobs stipulated that the drugs were tested 
using scientifically accepted methods.  This argument totally 
 
17 App. 482.   
18 App. 155. 
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misses the point.  Jacobs stipulated that each of the collected 
samples “was tested using scientifically accepted methods” 
and that the tested samples of Butter each contained a mixture 
of heroin and fentanyl.19  But that does not establish whether 
the quantity of fentanyl present in the tested samples was lethal 
or whether sufficient bags of heroin were sampled to conclude 
that the remaining packets also contained fentanyl. Moreover, 
the DEA testimony established that some of the remaining bags 
probably contained no fentanyl.   
D. 
The government argues that the Viking bags were in the 
zippered compartment of Ally’s closed shoulder bag and that 
it is therefore unlikely that she obtained her fatal dose from 
those bags.  It relies, in part, upon testimony from Detective 
Cowdright.  He testified that Ally’s closed shoulder bag was a 
“to-go bag for drug users” to imply that she relied upon those 
Viking bags when outside the apartment.20  The government 
contrasts those bags to the Butter bags strewn on the floor and 
on top of a trashcan in the apartment.  However, concluding 
that Ally did not use drugs from her “to-go bag” the night of 
her death is not without problems.  The government did not 
even establish whether the compartment of her bag containing 
the Viking packets was zippered closed when it was found.  
This argument thus did not have the benefit of the stronger 
inference that could have arisen if her bag had been zippered 
closed.  It is reasonable to assume that one who is intent on 
getting high would not close the bag she retrieved the drugs 
from before using them.      
The government also made no attempt to establish the 
source of the Viking bags.  That heroin certainly was never tied 
to Jacobs.  Though the government established that Jacobs 
supplied Butter heroin to Collins who then sold it to Ally, she 
may have had additional dealers.  Ally’s boyfriend, Kane, even 
testified that sometimes her friend Patrick drove her to get 
drugs.  In fact, Patrick drove her to get drugs from Collins on 
the night of her death.  For reasons known only to the 
government, Patrick was neither called to testify at trial nor 
 
19 App. 115. 
20 App. 476. 
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even interviewed by Detective Cowdright.21  There was thus 
no way to know if Patrick had also taken Ally to purchase drugs 
from someone other than Collins on the night of her death, and 
the government apparently made no effort to eliminate that 
possibility.   
Even if Ally did buy exclusively from Collins, he 
testified that he could not remember if he had ever sold a 
Viking or Bulldog bag, as he had “sold so many different 
stamps.”22  Collins also testified that he had been dealing 
Jacobs’s drugs exclusively for only three months before Ally’s 
death.  Collins had dealt to Ally for the past two-and-a-half 
years.  Accordingly, Ally may have kept the drugs Collins sold 
prior to those three months or drugs from other dealers in her 
“to-go” bag.  Since she may have taken drugs from that bag the 
night of her overdose and none of that was tied to Jacobs, the 
fatal dose could have come from a supply that was not 
traceable to Jacobs.  
II.  
Of course, as I noted at the outset, the government need 
not negate all possible alternatives to Jacobs being the fatal 
dealer.  Its burden is only proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not 
beyond all doubt.23  The government, however, was required 
to produce a case that does not undermine public faith in 
judicial proceedings.  Yet that is exactly what it did here by 
submitting a case with so many gaps and blatant failures in its 
investigation.  Nevertheless, because the threshold for our 
review is so low and the totality of the evidence rises slightly 
above pure speculation, as Judge Ambro explains, I simply 
cannot conclude that the government’s long list of failures here 
left the jury with insufficient evidence to find Jacobs guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even though it comes perilously 
close to doing so.   
 
21 App. 508–09 (Q: “[D]id any member of law enforcement 
involved in this investigation interview Patrick?” A: “We had 
discussed it. I don’t know if he was interviewed by the DEA 
or not.”  “Would they have told me? . . . I’m not too sure.  I 
don’t have any information on whether Patrick was 
interviewed by them or not.”). 
22 App. 669–70. 
23 Isaac, 134 F.3d at 202.   
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Moreover, although I am troubled by the extrapolation 
problems that I have pointed out, as well as the absence of a 
quantitative analysis, it is undisputed that Ally consumed a 
fatal dose of fentanyl that was mixed with heroin.  Also, Kane’s 
testimony does establish that it was more likely than not that 
the heroin she ingested came from Jacobs—even though the 
link is a tenuous one.  Thus, for the reasons Judge Ambro 
explains and that I have tried to point out, the evidence and 
testimony that the government did manage to present at trial 
just barely crosses the very low threshold necessary under 
plain-error review.  I therefore agree that there is enough 
evidence for the jury to have found Jacobs guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
That certainly does not prevent me from explaining the 
problems with this evidence, the highly speculative nature of 
it, or the tenaciously tenuous thread connecting Jacobs with 
Ally’s fatal heroin injection.  I also think it is important to note 
that the failure of the government to adequately do its job here 
unnecessarily complicated the jury’s decision-making and thus 
our review.   
Nevertheless, because the evidence barely crosses the 
necessary threshold for finding sufficient evidence, I 
reluctantly join the Majority in finding a rational juror could 
have decided Jacobs was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—
for all the reasons Judge Ambro explains.   
